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Abstract 
Our interest is to stimulate the development of innovative approaches to continuously 
assuring the cybersecurity of open architecture (OA) software systems. We focus on 
exploring the potential for using blockchains and smart contract techniques and how these 
techniques can be applied to support acquisition efforts for software systems for OA 
command and control, or business enterprise (C2/B) systems. We further limit our focus to 
examining the routine software system updates to OA software configuration specifications 
that arise during the development and evolution processes arising during system acquisition. 
We discuss new ways and means by which blockchains and smart contracts can be used to 
continuously assure the cybersecurity of software updates arising during OA software system 
development and evolution processes. We present a case study examining the software 
evolution process that updates an OA C2/B system to describe these details. We then 
discuss some consequences that follow for what emerges from these innovations in the 
expanded scope of cybersecurity assurance of not just the delivered OA C2/B software 
systems, but also in the engineering processes which create, transform, or otherwise update 
technical data that is central to the acquisition of OA software systems. 
Overview 
How might we stimulate the development of innovative approaches to continuously 
assuring the cybersecurity of open architecture (OA) software systems? This is the 
acquisition research challenge we are addressing. In particular, we are interested in 
investigating innovations that represent either incremental improvements or substantial 
departures from our current acquisition practices for such systems. We target our efforts to 
practical OA software system production, deployment, and sustainment, for applications like 
command and control or business enterprise (C2/B) systems that are central to the mission 
and operations of military or industrial enterprises. We seek to stimulate significant 
innovations that employ emerging concepts and technologies to problems observable in the 
acquisition, development, and evolution of modern C2/B systems.  
Problem 
The particular problem we investigate here is how best to develop and demonstrate 
a new conceptual approach to providing continuous cybersecurity assurance (DoD & GSA, 
2013) with OA C2/B software systems in response to evolutionary updates to currently 
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installed software configurations that routinely arise during the technical development and 
maintenance, upkeep, and sustainment in the field—what we call “software evolution.” 
Solution 
The innovations we focus our attention to are the concepts, techniques, and 
technologies that denote blockchains and smart contracts, along with how they can be used 
to continuously assure the cybersecurity of software updates arising during OA software 
system development and evolution processes. 
Approach 
Our efforts focus on an innovative utilization of blockchains and smart contracts 
within the technical software development and evolution processes that arise within the 
acquisition of complex OA C2/B software systems. We are not focusing attention at this time 
to software purchasing activities or financial transactions, though blockchains and smart 
contracts are likely to stimulate innovations in this aspect of OA software system acquisition. 
Why This Approach? 
Based on prior studies of issues and challenges arising in the development and 
evolution of OA software systems for C2/B system applications (Guertin, Sweeney, & 
Schmidt, 2015; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012–2017; Womble et al., 2011), we have already 
drawn attention to technical problems that arise in the software engineering processes that 
software producers, system integrators, and customer end-users (both enterprises and 
individuals therein) experience. But we recognize these processes are partially-ordered sets 
of activities whose completion often entails technical data transactions like creation of digital 
system design documents, composition and integration of software components (e.g., 
applications, mobile apps, plug-in widgets), and deployed software executable/update 
packages that are stored, installed, and tracked in different online repositories across a 
network environment. At present, these transactions often lack a common or centralized 
repository for tracking these diverse transactions across networked platforms that span an 
OA software system ecosystem (a supply chain network from producers to system 
integrators to customer enterprises/individuals). We believe blockchains are a candidate for 
this. These transactions similarly lack a common and potentially reusable specification for 
how to manage and track such software engineering transactions in forms that are open to 
independent validation and audit. We believe smart contracts are a candidate to address 
this. 
Background: Blockchains and Smart Contracts as Ledgers and Contractual 
Agreements for Tracking and Managing Transactions 
Blockchains are a 21st century computational mechanism for realizing the equivalent 
of the traditional bookkeeping ledger utilized in finance and accounting. Such ledgers record 
and track the assignment of incoming (budget authorization or revenue) and outgoing 
(allocations and expenses) enterprise transactions and denominated amounts, whether in a 
monetary currency, bartered trade, or some other transactional resource (e.g., gold bullion, 
Bitcoins, original artworks; DuPont & Maurer, 2015). Such transactions are grouped in 
blocks; for example, a set of interrelated OA software system updates may be grouped 
together into a block that denotes a transformation of the current system configuration into 
an evolved system configuration. Both transactions and blocks are serialized, logged, 
timestamped, and tracked in ways that are open to internal, external, or independent 
verification and audit by decentralized third-parties (“Blockchain,” n.d.). Updates to the 
blockchain are allowed only by consensus of remote mechanisms and proofs of work by 
anonymous, untrusted service providers (called miners) who collect a modest execution fee 
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for their efforts. The payment and deposit of an execution fee also mitigates against the 
actions of unknown others who might act to corrupt the blockchain state. Finally, 
blockchains can be realized as persistent databases or cloud-based repositories 
(“Blockchain,” n.d.). Figure 1 displays a traditional centralized ledger versus a decentralized 
blockchain ledger. 
 
 Traditional Ledger Network (Left) and Decentralized Blockchain Ledger 
Network (Right) 
Blockchains operate as an append-only data structure or database maintained by a 
decentralized collection of mutually distrusting computational nodes participating in a peer-
to-peer network. Blockchains are secure by design (“Blockchain,” n.d.). Blockchain ledgers 
are updated (appended) as a result of recorded transactions, much like a personal bank 
account is updated through deposit, withdrawal, credit, or debit transactions made by the 
account holder, through a third-party (the bank or transaction system processor), who may 
charge a fee for transactions. Much like bank account transactions, blockchain update 
transactions are distributed over a network, time-stamped, persistent, and verifiable. 
However, the peer-to-peer network of blockchain nodes is a decentralized autonomous 
authority without legal standing, compared to the centralized authority taken by a bank or 
credit/debit card transaction processor.  
Smart contracts are similarly the computational counterparts of traditional paper 
contracts for how a group of interrelated transactions will be governed to assure fulfillment of 
terms, conditions, rights, and obligations. Such transactions, for example, may be 
associated with the acquisition of a complex system or with the ongoing procurement of 
retail supply purchasing agreements. These smart contracts denote networked software 
Acquisition Research Program: 
Creating Synergy for Informed Change - 319 - 
system protocols that facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or performance of a 
specified contract, and thus denote which transactions to process (where, when, how, and 
for what parties) in what order (“Smart Contracts,” n.d.). They are realized using computer-
based, formal specifications of transaction-based processes that can be codified into 
executable computer programs. Such computational support allows for modeling, analysis, 
and simulation of transactions or processes that can be enacted, verified, and validated at 
Internet-time speeds, with precision and automated recall of transaction details well beyond 
what enterprises have traditionally performed. Smart contracts also allow for the 
establishment and operation of decentralized autonomous services that allow for 
cooperating parties to enact and fulfill the details of a shared contract through only 
automated means. Next, smart contracts are automatically enforced by the consensus 
mechanism associated with the blockchain. Smart contracts are thus attractive to use to 
securely manage recurring transactions between known or unknown parties, such as those 
associated with updating the technical data, source code, repositories, and related artifacts 
associated with the software development and evolution processes of large, long-term 
software acquisition efforts.  
Blockchains are being extended to accommodate smart contracts that allow for the 
formation of virtual, decentralized autonomous organizations that act to govern, enforce, and 
assure the integrity and validity of complex or idiosyncratic blockchain update transactions 
(“Smart Contracts,” n.d.). For example, multi-party agreements whereby two or more 
program offices or other enterprises can act to share the procurement costs of a new C2/B 
system application or component of mutual interest to the participating parties (Reed et al., 
2012; Reed et al., 2014; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015). Similarly, smart contracts can govern 
transactions between mutually distrusting participants that are automatically enforced by 
automated consensus mechanisms associated with blockchain updates. This capability thus 
provides a mechanism for detecting, rejecting, or preventing unauthorized update 
transactions to the blockchain, as might be attempted via a cyber attack during OA software 
system development or evolution. Accordingly, our interest is to investigate how 
blockchains, smart contracts, and related technologies can be utilized to improve 
cybersecurity, specifically to manage and track software engineering development and 
evolution processes that entail process transactions that update the configuration of OA 
software systems. 
So how might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to innovate the continuous 
development and evolution of OA systems? How can this be conceived and applied in ways 
that are not specifically limited to financial transactions commonly associated with system 
acquisition?  
Blockchains and Smart Contracts for Installed Software Configurations 
How might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to record, track, and verify 
updates to OA software system configurations as they evolve over time? We examine this 
question in this section. 
Ledgers of Installed Software Configurations 
We envision a new kind of ledger: one that records executable computational 
updates to the specification of the current installed, operational configuration of C2/B 
systems of interest. The executable computational updates are similar to scripts in a 
declarative scripting language, like those used to direct the invocation of utilities on an 
operating system, procedural scripts involved in building (compiling and integrating) a 
targeted software executable, or for customizing the functional display and navigation 
operations within a Web browser. We call the repository in which this specification is 
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recorded the installed software configuration (ISC) ledger. Such a specification is a kind of 
technical data to be managed with an acquisition effort.  
The ISC ledger records the transactions that update the software applications, 
including their components, interconnections, interfaces, or licenses for such installed on 
each machine of interest, such as a desktop PC, smartphone, or central computation server 
within a mission command or enterprise data center. The installation is enacted via an 
installation (update) transaction, which may be enabled using an “installation wizard” for a 
standalone PC application, or using a ready-to-install packaged software app acquired from 
an online app store. For each application installed, the ledger lists the repository from which 
the software app or update was acquired, the version of the application or update, and some 
information with which to confirm/verify the version, such as the size of that version of the 
app, meta-data about where it resides in storage on the machine, other information, or a 
combination of these. How do we ensure that the repository’s copy is safe, has not been 
unintentionally modified, and has not been attacked or unknowingly compromised? How do 
we ensure that attacks are not falsely recorded in the ledger?  
In order for a ledger to be up-to-date, each approved installation must be recorded 
there. How do we ensure this is the case for approved installations? If a ledger is up to date, 
then an auditor can verify the approved installations by examining the ISC specification for 
the machine of interest (e.g., a smartphone or laptop PC). Furthermore and most 
importantly, the blockchain can be queried to identify non-approved or non-compliant 
installations and whether these are apps or updates that were innocently installed but not 
recorded in the ledger or attacks—maliciously injected software for some nefarious purpose, 
which would not be recorded in the ledger. In either case, the auditor can then institute for 
each application that does not match the ledger a rollback to a known safe ISC state 
matching what has previously been verified on the ledger. 
The following issues must be managed appropriately for the ledger scheme to 
succeed.  
 How is it ensured that the origination or destination repository’s copy is 
safe and has not been attacked? 
This is a separate concern, and one that is equally problematic with or 
without a ledger system. We do not discuss it further here, merely noting that 
it must be ensured for devices to remain secure. But in normal operation, the 
ISC specification has a unique identifier in the hashcode value associated 
with the current system when last updated and verified by miners, and this 
hashcode may reveal whether the ISC specification copy’s hashcode 
matches the one checked during audit or subsequent miner verification 
activities. If the hashcode values are different, then something has altered the 
copy, and thus it may be rolled back to a prior verified state or ISC 
specification. 
 How is it ensured that every approved installation or update is recorded 
in the ledger? 
The ledger system must be integrated with whatever system manages 
installations and updates for the machines in question. We note that 
unapproved installations or updates can be automatically detected and can 
be rolled back or reverted at the next audit point/event, so there will be a 
strong motivation to ensure that desired transactions are recorded. 
 How do we ensure that attacks are not falsely recorded in the ledger? 
Obviously this is a key concern. As discussed later, changes to the ledger are 
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validated by multiple autonomous parties (miners) using several sources of 
information, and each particular copy of a ledger competes with all others for 
accuracy as part of the blockchain scheme. 
Transactions for Installed Software Configurations 
Each transaction in a ledger records an installation or update of an app on a specific 
machine. How do we ensure that all valid installations or updates are presented? Every time 
a new application is installed, or an existing application is updated, the appropriate 
information is recorded in the ledger. If an application is installed or updated without being 
recorded in the ledger, that installation or update is recognized as unverified, and thus rolled 
back the next time the machine is audited. Audits may simply involve checking a hashcode 
value (a long, non-guessable string of characters that is generated within the blockchain 
system) associated with the current ISC specification on the target machine, with the 
corresponding value in the blockchain (this is a simple match-checking query that can be 
performed periodically), or by enterprise policy. When the audit reveals a mismatch, then a 
rollback may be triggered that reverts the ISC on the machine to a previously trusted ISC, 
and then removes, deprecates, or flags the unverified ISC as suspect, along with distributing 
a notification to relevant parties of such action following enterprise policy. But how do we 
ensure that only valid installations or updates are presented? Transactions that would 
record an invalid installation or update, fraudulently misrepresenting the repository’s 
version’s size or hash or from an untrusted repository, are identified by comparison with the 
set of trusted repositories, with the size and hash information recorded there for the 
installation or update in question, and for the data calculated from the destination machine 
afterwards. Accordingly, we are acting to use blockchain techniques as intended, but for a 
new kind of use case, namely that of ISC specification update, verification, and 
reconciliation. 
Smart Contracts for Installed Software Configurations 
A smart contract works within the framework of the blockchain ledger and transaction 
system, ensuring that the required obligations for each transaction are met before the 
transaction is enacted, verified, and then recorded in the ledger. These obligations are 
associated with those we have previously identified and specified as security requirements 
for ensuring access and update rights encoded in a software system’s security license 
(Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012). 
An Example Ledger, Transaction, Smart Contract Implementation System 
Ethereum is being used to implement smart contracts, transactions, and a blockchain 
ledger (“Ethereum,” n.d.). Ethereum is a set of technologies: a general-purpose 
programming language, open application program interfaces (APIs), and an open 
transaction/blockchain repository associated with the APIs. Ethereum uses a cryptocurrency 
called ether, and users of Ethereum can transfer money, ownership, or control of exchanged 
resources whose (fungible) value is denominated in the form of ether between each other 
and to contracts to hold in escrow. Online currency exchange markets can exist for 
converting ether to a traditional currency like U.S. dollars. Users of Ethereum send 
transactions to it in order to create contracts, invoke existing contracts, and transfer ether. 
The transactions are public and permanently recorded in the blockchain, unless access to 
the blockchain is restricted/private to an authorized set of known parties who must be 
granted permission to access or update the blockchain.  
Ethereum is decentralized, with a network of blockchains for which each transaction 
is processed by a number of miners, possibly anonymous actors, who perform computations 
on the blockchain that collectively verify the validity of a transaction of data/value between 
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the participating parties. These miners are mutually-untrusted peers who are paid fees (in 
ether) for the work of processing each transaction and its contract provisions. A miner 
groups transactions into blocks and performs a calculation (or “solves a puzzle”) that takes 
as inputs the previous block in the blockchain and the transactions in the new block. A valid 
block, one whose puzzle has been solved and which meets certain other conditions, can be 
appended to the blockchain. The miner broadcasts the new valid block to the network and 
receives the ether paid for each of the transactions by their originators. In this way, 
Ethereum-based smart contracts are validated by decentralized miners who receive 
payment when contracted transactions they verify are successfully appended by consensus 
to the blockchain. 
A transaction may appear in a number of different blocks, produced by different 
miners and appended to different blockchains. Ethereum pays miners somewhat more to 
append a block to a longer blockchain, which has the effect, over time, of converging the 
ledger to the blocks and thus transactions that the majority of miners agree are valid. 
Continuous Software Development and Evolution Processes for Open Architecture 
Software Systems 
In previous work, we have identified and substantiated seven types of software 
evolution process update transactions, shown in Figure 2. We further observe that a given 
software evolution process may entail either (a) one type of transaction per update, or (b) 
multiple concurrent types of updates per transaction. This may be due to current-to-evolved 
transformations where the evolved system version of the OA configuration involves the 
replacement of more than one component arising from the availability of a new technology 
that represents a departure from the current system architecture, or that integrates 
functionally similar capabilities through a new mix of components, interfaces and 
interconnections (e.g., when combining multiple widgets into mashups; Endres-Niggemeyer, 
2013). The purpose may be to reduce software maintenance complexity and extend the 
sustainability of a deployed current (or legacy) system through adoption and integration of 
remote (cloud-based) services that are functionally similar to the capabilities formerly 
available in multiple components. For example, replacing legacy office productivity 
applications (word processor, email, calendar) with browser-based remote networked 
services (Google Docs, Microsoft Office 365), can provide end-users with functionally-similar 
processing capabilities, but with fewer application components installed on the end-user’s 
desktop PC system. Furthermore, subsequent updates to remote services may by policy be 
integrated and deployed automatically for minor functionally equivalent evolutionary updates 
(e.g., bug fixes), or be deployed only by request or authorization when functionally similar 
system version updates are made available (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a, 2015, 2016, 
2017). 
Blockchains and Smart Contracts for Managing Software Development and 
Evolution Process Transactions 
How might we utilize blockchains and smart contracts to manage software 
development or evolution updates to OA software system configurations over time? We 
examine this question in the following section.  
Ledger: What Versions of What Software Components and Connectors Are Integrated 
in What OA Configuration Topology 
A ledger records and defines through the design-time OA specification, the 
ecosystem in which the OA is evolving (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2012). The OA is represented 
using an architecture description language, and successive ledger entries record successive 
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configurations of the OA system as it evolves. The ledger as a whole presents the history of 
the OA’s evolution, and as long as the components and connectors remain available from 
their repositories, an instance of any stage of the OA can be rebuilt as needed. At a 
minimum the ledger records every release of the OA system. 
 
 Seven Types of Software Evolution Update Transactions  
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013) 
If a machine on which the OA ISC is installed needs to be rolled back to an earlier 
configuration, the desired version of the ISC can be rebuilt guided by the corresponding 
ledger entry. 
Transactions: OA Evolution Steps 
Each transaction corresponds to one (or several) of the seven types of OA evolution, 
stating which component, connector, or license is being changed or what change is being 
made to the OA topology. In total, the sequence of all transactions for an OA system 
represents the history of its evolution. The ledger summarizes the system’s evolution, based 
on the transactions made to it, and presents each of the versions that the evolution has 
proceeded through. 
Not everyone can record a transaction with the ledger, and each actor that can 
record a transaction may be restricted in precisely what sorts of transactions can be 
recorded. These restrictions ensure that the OA ISC is evolved through steps that preserve 
its security. It also accommodates actors who may or may not have been vetted and 
authorized so that they are trusted to preserve the system’s security through their 
transactions. 
Smart Contracts: Enforcing Obligations for Each OA Evolution Step 
Smart contracts restrict the transactions that may occur to those believed to preserve 
the OA system’s security as the system evolves. A transaction may only be enacted if the 
actor doing to has been vetted and authorized for it, and has presented credentials 
identifying himself appropriately; and also only if the current state of the OA system 
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development and the evolution step(s) proposed meet the conditions imposed by a smart 
contract associated with the ledger. The smart contract in essence states obligations that 
the actor, the evolution step, and the OA system must meet in order for the transaction to 
occur; if the obligations are not met, then the transaction cannot be performed, at least not 
with this smart contract. The obligations declared in a smart contract indicate which parties 
or actors can access/update what OA system elements or other technical data arising during 
software development or evolution processes. As before, these process obligations are 
similar to those previously identified for controlling software system/data usage obligations, 
along the rights to access and update the system/data provided to developer, system 
integrators, or end-users (Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012). 
It is possible that more than one smart contract may potentially allow a specific 
transaction, each contract presenting a different set of obligations. But in any case the 
transaction cannot proceed until a smart contract for the ledger allows it to do so. 
To help make clear what we are looking to accomplish through our efforts to 
stimulate innovation in securing the development and evolution of OA software systems, we 
now turn to present a case study focusing on updating the installed software configuration of 
a deployed current OA C2/B software system. 
Case Study: OA C2/B Software System Evolution Process Updates 
In this case study, we describe how blockchains and smart contracts can be 
employed to model and analyze cybersecurity requirements for OA software systems that 
arise during the software evolution processes. As described previously, there are seven 
types of software evolution process updates that take a current system, transform it one of 
the seven ways, which produces an evolved system. This evolution process iteratively 
cycles through software development processes that build, release, and deploy (Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2013b, 2017) installed software configurations once the development life cycle 
starts. The process continues to (slowly) cycle over time, until the system is retired or 
abandoned. Our focus further narrows to evolving OA C2/B systems that incorporate 
multiple end-user computing platforms, such as smartphones, tablets, or other Web-
compatible “edge” devices (Zheng & Carter, 2015), as we have addressed before (Scacchi 
& Alspaugh, 2015, 2016). 
Blockchain ledgers serve to verify in a decentralized manner the proper sequencing 
of valid transactions for a user/device account. Such an account operates like a personal 
bank account that can be used to deposit and withdraw funds (e.g., through account 
transactions associated with a debit/credit card that is bound to the account). The enterprise 
that manages accounts for users may charge a fee for account transactions, though such 
fees may be assigned to a third-party (e.g., the party who receives payment via a card that 
has been authorized to possess sufficient funds balance to cover the payment in the future). 
The current “balance of funds” in a software evolution process account indicates the name, 
size, and other meta-data that identify executable software applications (including mobile 
apps, plug-in widgets, or other installed software). At present, computing platforms or 
devices do not maintain software process transaction accounts, but in our scheme they 
would.  
Next, the blockchain ledger as a decentralized database would be distributed across 
a (virtual private) network of computing systems, such as those with restricted, authenticated 
access to a centralized C2/B system host/sub-network. Said differently, if we have 
smartphones or mobile/laptop PCs that can roam in the wild, and intentionally or 
unintentionally acquire software updates (e.g., known app updates but with revised access 
rights; new social media apps; or cyber-penetration attack vectors via misdirected access to 
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a remote server), we want all such evolutionary software update transactions to be 
reconciled and validated against the corresponding virtual private network’s blockchain 
ledger in ways that maintain device/user autonomy, but reveal and can reject unvalidated 
evolutionary updates. The ways and means for how valid or invalid transactions are 
revealed (externally documented on the blockchain) or rejected (e.g., enforced automated 
uninstallation, external network access blocked, or notify user of problematic update) are 
determined by enterprise cybersecurity policies encoded into an associated smart contract 
(a functional software program logically isolated from end-user application software).  
Let us consider the following usage scenario. Suppose we have a mission platform 
like a battleship or a multi-ship flotilla (or, alternatively, an aircraft flight wing, a ground-
based command post, or remote enterprise business office) assigned to operate within an 
international location. Such a location may be in a region known to have a history of prior 
cybersecurity attacks on personal computers, mobile, or Web-based devices that access the 
public Internet. Mission personnel are restricted by policy from using their enterprise mobile 
devices outside the cybersecurity perimeter of the mission platform. However, personnel 
may also possess and use private personal devices, such as low-cost smartphones that are 
used for non-mission purposes.  
As anyone who possesses and routinely uses a mobile/edge device like a 
smartphone or laptop PC now frequently experiences, software (evolution) updates are 
common, sometimes one or more per week across the 30–60+ apps found on such devices. 
Sometimes mistakes are made by personnel regarding which device to use for accessing 
remote services like making phone calls to home, to informally coordinate with friends in 
allied forces, to check for local restaurants offering interesting local cuisines, or to post data 
for sharing on social media. Access control to some devices may be misconfigured due to a 
prior update or unintentionally left open in a discoverable device pairing mode, so that other 
unknown devices or remote computers can quietly/covertly make network connections that 
enable data/files upload, download, or remote control. Mobile or web-based edge devices 
will be relentlessly targeted for cyber attack, so when a cyber attack vulnerability is in the 
hands of opposing forces or hostile competitors, we assume they will seek out and attack 
these vulnerabilities at some time and place. It is therefore these invalid software evolution 
updates to installed software configurations that denote potential cyber attacks that we seek 
to detect, isolate, trace, expunge or prevent, using the capabilities of blockchains and smart 
contracts. In this way, our use of blockchains and smart contracts is innovative, original, and 
not previously associated with software evolution process transactions. 
Consider a desktop PC with apps/widgets acquired from either a restricted-access 
enterprise-specific app store, a Defense app store (George et al., 2014; George, Morris, & 
O’Neil, 2014), or else from a public-access app store or OSS component repository. Web 
browser-based apps like cloud-based word processors, calendars, and email app services 
are frequently included in such stores. However, open access app stores (like those 
operated by Apple, Google, Microsoft, and others) also offer free/low-cost apps that offer 
many other remote, cloud-based services. In either situation, these remote service apps 
may operate downloaded software code that runs within a platform-based Web browser that 
accesses public or (virtual) private networks. Enterprise end-users with computer 
programming expertise may even create and integrate multiple apps/widgets into mashups 
as a kind of end-user software evolution process update (Endres-Niggemeyer, 2013; 
Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015). These mashups may enable the participating apps/widgets to 
interoperate, exchange or update local data, or transfer data/files to/from remote networked 
repositories (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015, 2016). 
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If our mobile device is a laptop PC, its current (or legacy) OA software configuration 
may include open source software (OSS) or proprietary closed source software (CSS) 
versions of a common Web browser, word processor, email, calendar, and more hosted on 
the PC’s operating system. For instance, a laptop may have a Firefox web browser (OSS), 
AbiWord (OSS) or Microsoft Word (CSS) word processor, Gnome Evolution (fOSS) or 
Outlook (CSS) for email and calendaring, and host a PC operating system like a 
Fedora/Linux distribution (OSS), Microsoft Windows (CSS), or Apple OSX (CSS and OSS). 
The deployed, run-time executable version of this OA ISC system on the laptop PC may 
appear to an end-user as an array of loosely-coupled applications, such as displayed in 
Figure 3. Now, suppose a decision has been made to update this OA ISC system, to evolve 
it from the current configuration to one where the word processor, email, and calendaring 
applications hosted on the laptop PC are to be replaced with functionally similar remote Web 
services that will operate within the existing Web browser. These remote services thus entail 
reliance and usage of browser-based software components that are hosted in the cloud and 
downloaded on user demand. This transition can simplify and reduce the costs of 
corresponding software update services associated with locally hosted applications (e.g., 
recurring license fees for CSS elements). The resulting deployed and evolved laptop PC 
software system may appear to the end-user as shown in Figure 6. 
Each type of software evolution process update can have a smart contract 
associated with it. Each such contract programmatically specifies what computational 
actions need to be performed to complete the transaction with the affected technical data 
and associated data repositories, and similarly, what actions need to be performed on the 
blockchain. Let us consider the following transformation of a current ISC shown in Figure 3 
to an evolved ISC seen in Figure 6. Figure 3 corresponds to its ISC model visualized in 
Figure 4, which is derived from its specification in an architectural description language 
(ADL), as we have established before (Alspaugh, Asuncion, & Scacchi, 2013a; Alspaugh, 
Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010). As the current system, we assume for this moment, that it has 
previously been submitted via an earlier transaction on the blockchain that was verified by 
miners and thus is now a recorded part of the blockchain. Thus we can determine the 
provenance of the current ISC system and its specification. This blockchain contains a 
record of the ISC specification and the results (e.g., blockchain hashcode values) that the 
miners computed and agreed by anonymous vote to denote the ISC installed and 
operational on the target machine/platform. The transformation from this current system to 
the evolved system thus entails enaction of the associated smart contracts associated with a 
set of embedded evolution update transactions that collectively denote what updates must 
be verified as a block for the evolved ISC specification to be appended to the blockchain. 
For example, we may elect to use a predefined smart contract (an executable 
software script) whose transactions transform a component-based C2/B system with a Web 
browser installed, into a remote service-based C2/B system, where Web/cloud-based 
services provide functionally similar capabilities to end-users. This might entail a smart 
contract that performs the following transactions (described in English for simplicity): (1) 
check that the ISC blockchain hashcode value(s) match those for the current system; if 
matching, then proceed; (2) deprecate and replace designated software application 
components with remote service apps/widgets; (3) replace deprecated component licenses 
with remote services licenses (e.g., ToS); (4) replace ISC interconnection topology with the 
evolved ISC; (5) send request to miners to independently compute and verify the evolved 
ISC specification hashcode value on the target machine/platform denotes the ISC and 
associated meta-data they independently build to compute the evolved ISC hashcode; (6) if 
miners’ vote independently verifies the ISC specification, then assert into the blockchain the 
evolved ISC specification value as denoting the new current ISC ready for use; and (e) 
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perform end of contract transactions. Many low-level details are not described here, but 
would need to be in a smart contract. These details can include, for instance, the installation 
parameter settings that are selected or configured by either the end-user or installation 
script, in line with a security technical implementation guide (STIG) for the targeted 
machine/platform.  
The software evolution conveyed in the smart contract example will change the 
topological configuration of software components found in the system integration build 
specification, release, and deployed run-time architectures. Here we see that in Figure 5, 
the configuration model of the evolved OA system still incorporates the same kind of 
components as the current system model (shown in Figure 4), but now the topology of 
components interconnections and interfaces has been updated to realize the deployed, run-
time desktop software. Last, a transformation from the current software components with 
their respective licenses, to the evolved configuration will also entail an update to new 
licenses (e.g., Google Terms of Service), and how these components will be secured (from 
end-user level assurance of locally installed components to end-user agreement with 
remotely provided component security that is mostly invisible to end-users).  
 
 Current Deployed OA ISC Corresponding to Figure 4, Utilized by End-
Users 
Note. Firefox Web Browser (Upper Left), Evolution Calendar (Lower Left), AbiWord Word 
Processor (Upper Right), and Fedora/Linux Desktop Operating System Platform (Lower 
Right) 
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 Current ISC Specification for OA C2/B System 
(Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013, 2017) 
Note. This is the current ISC specification for an OA C2/B system within security containers 
at build-time, intended to denote a record on the blockchain for which components need to be 
included during integration (and testing) of the software components and code APIs within 
the released and deployed ISC. 
 
 The Evolved OA ISC Specification at Build-Time 
Note. The topology of the ISC has evolved, including where now legacy components have 
been deprecated and likely marked for eventual removal, so as to eliminate any residual 
vulnerability pathway still present. 
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 Evolved OA ISC Corresponding to Figure 5, Installed for Utilization by 
End-Users 
Note. Firefox Web Browser as Before (Upper Left), Google Calendar (Lower Left), Google 
Docs (Upper Right), and Fedora/Linux Operating System Platform as Before (Lower Right) 
The transformation of the current system in Figure 3 and Figure 4 to the evolved 
system in Figure 5 and Figure 6 entails multiple types of software system evolution updates. 
But now we must consider whether and how such evolution process transactions potentially 
allow for introduction of cybersecurity vulnerabilities or attack vectors. This can happen, for 
instance, in the following ways: If the current system is trusted, because its components 
have individually had their security tested for known vulnerabilities and have passed 
assurance checks, then evolution process update transactions may introduce unintended 
vulnerabilities, either within the components replaced, within the new topological 
configuration, via shifts in the obligations or rights (added, subtracted, revised) in the new 
components, or via the overall incorporation of all of these evolutionary updates. So we 
need to assure the security of the update transactions acquired from the component 
producers and from the system integrators.  
As these transactions entail request-response transactions with remote parties 
across a network, then they may be vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks, as well as to 
mistakes made in selecting the appropriate component versions for the specific edge device 
platform. So we want these transactions to be coordinated and tracked using blockchains 
and smart contracts, so that we can better trust the security of the evolution process 
updates. Said differently, we want any and all updates that affect the OA software system 
components, interconnections and interfaces, or licenses to be mediated and verified by 
remote parties via blockchain transactions. This entails that each edge device or system 
platform must be able to periodically (e.g., daily, after an application program exits, or by 
mission-specific policy) identify itself and assert the “value” of its current ISC elements and 
configuration specification, in a way that can be reconciled against the last known 
corresponding verified values on the blockchain. If a discrepancy between the value of the 
last known (and trusted) current system configuration, and the system evolved configuration 
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is detected, then some unknown evolution update has occurred, such that system security is 
now unknown and may no longer be trusted. Such a condition may then produce a 
notification of such discrepancy, automatically revert to the last known trusted current 
system, or some other intervention action, depending on the evolution process update 
security policies expressed in the corresponding smart contract. Subsequently, we now 
have new ways and means for assuring, detecting, or preventing authorized/unauthorized 
evolutionary changes to an OA ISC during the software development and evolution 
processes which occur routinely during a system acquisition effort. 
Overall, the purpose of this case study is to help describe and reveal that common 
and widespread acquisition processes associated with the development, usage, or evolution 
of OA software systems supporting C2/B mission applications is not necessarily secure, and 
thus can allow for unknown or poorly understood evolutionary updates that are intended or 
not. Our efforts begin to characterize the need to continuously secure and assure these 
software engineering process updates and their provenance. Such continuous assurance 
capabilities are needed in addition to other techniques that focus on assuring the security 
and integrity of the individual software components acquired from diverse producers or 
integrators through software ecosystems that release deployable run-time software 
applications or remote services. 
Discussion 
There are three topics we find merit consideration, given what now appears possible 
in the use of blockchains and smart contracts as mechanisms for assuring software 
development and evolution process update transactions for OA C2/B systems. These are 
(a) how cyberattacks that may potentially arise in traditional software engineering processes 
can now be prevented, detected or marked for action; (b) innovations in acquisition research 
that may follow; and (c) future extensions of this line of research and study. 
Cyberattacks on Software Evolution, Release, and Update Processes  
The types of software evolution updates in Figure 2 also classify comparable types of 
attacks on OA systems during their development, build, deployment, and run time 
processes. The difference being that cyberattacks on software denote unauthorized or 
unverified updates from the current ISC during design-time, build-time, and deployment-time 
software engineering activities, to an evolved ISC. This implies that covert software 
evolution changes by an attacker may follow the same steps as those by a trusted software 
producer or system integrator, namely replacement of a component by a newer version or 
by a different component, access to a component through a different interface, replacement 
of a connector, or replacement of the topological configuration. (We are presently unaware 
of attacks involving replacement of a component license, but such attacks that 
change/rewrite IP or security license obligations and rights are clearly possible [Scacchi & 
Alspaugh, 2012, 2015, 2016].) The result is a compromised version of the system that is 
functionally similar to the current (trusted) ISC system, but masquerading as one that is 
authorized, validated, and functionally equivalent intended not to be recognized as 
something different. 
When the attack is made on a deployed instance of the ISC system, its presence can 
be identified by the change in the size or hashcode value of the compromised system, 
compared to the current system’s provenance established in the blockchain. The window of 
time during which the attacked system may take effect is limited by the frequency with which 
the edge device’s software is compared with what the blockchain ledger recorded as being 
installed, as after any change is discovered the edge system’s software can be rolled back 
to its (prior, now current) trusted configuration. 
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The process is more complex for attacks during development, build, and deployment, 
because the context is more complex. Here we wish to prevent insecure components, 
connectors, and configurations from being incorporated into the OA system, but an OA 
system is by its nature typically the result of a distributed, decentralized development, with 
components coming from other projects and developed and evolved by parties distant and 
often unknown to the OA system’s integrators. We foresee the use of blockchains, 
transactions, and smart contracts to record each component and connector’s provenance, 
vetting, and authorization. Smart contracts restrict the possible transactions (evolution steps) 
to those believed to preserve the OA system’s security. When an unexpected change is 
discovered in an edge device system’s software, it is rolled back to a safe version; when a 
security fault is discovered in a version of the system, a process that may be much more 
involved, the components, connectors, and topology involved may be rolled back to a 
trusted safe version, and the smart contracts through which the fault was introduced may be 
updated to prevent a “similar” evolution in the future. This may be done either by 
withdrawing authorization from actors involved, by blacklisting a component repository 
whose vetting was careless, or by similar means. The blockchain ledger records the 
information needed to take such steps. 
This points to two further areas of research. First, the blockchain ledger system now 
becomes a locus against which attackers will wish to operate, and further study is needed to 
examine how to resist such attacks, isolate their effect, and to the extent possible reject 
them through the blockchain and transaction mechanism itself. Second, can the ledger be 
used as a database of information for effectively distinguishing fraudulent or corrupted 
evolution steps? Further research will be necessary.  
The only allowed OA evolution updates of the secure system are those that are first 
verified as valid updates, from known trusted parties, and that satisfy a contract for the 
blockchain ledger. In cases where a vulnerable or corrupted component, connector, or 
topology successfully runs this gauntlet, the ledger provides a means for rolling back 
transactions to a secure version of the system that can be deployed in place of the insecure 
later version. 
We note that in contrast to a procedural programming language such as the Solidity 
language used for Ethereum contracts, a declarative scripting language mitigates against 
recently discovered vulnerabilities of smart contract technologies, such as those found for 
the Ethereum run-time interpreter (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2016). 
Innovation for Acquisition Research 
The work prior to this paper in software cybersecurity is primarily focused on making 
a particular version of the software system itself, as a product, secure. In this paper, we are 
expanding our view to include the ecosystem within which the system evolves, the software 
architecture specification that defines and constrains that ecosystem, the evolution of the 
components and connectors that are integrated into the system, and the OA evolution 
process by which any OA system evolves from version to version. To this, we are adding the 
ability to record, track, verify, and maintain the security of the OA system throughout its 
development and evolution processes. 
We are proposing the use of blockchains and smart contracts to assure the security 
of software engineering process update transactions. We are not at this time investigating 
how blockchains and smart contracts may be used as potential mechanisms that support 
the financial transactions or new business models for purchasing the services or products 
associated with a OA software system acquisition (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2016). That is a 
topic for future research. Similarly, though blockchains and smart contracts are relatively 
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new, they also entail their own set of vulnerabilities associated with their different 
technological implementations (Atzei, Bartoletti, & Cimoli, 2016) that must be addressed. 
Whether or how such vulnerabilities may manifest within acquisition processes is also a 
topic for future research. 
Future Extensions and Elaborations of This Approach 
We have discussed the application of a blockchain system for coordinating and 
steering the evolution of an OA software system that is produced or integrated by a single 
party. But a blockchain system is by its nature a distributed system, and though its 
distributedness does not in itself give extra benefit in multi-producer, multi-integrator 
software ecosystems, clearly it is as effective in recording evolution and provenance in 
them, and it is already adapted to the challenges of interactions with many parties. 
In our prior research, we have called for a declarative domain-specific language 
(DSL) for specifying the obligations and rights incorporated into IP and security licenses for 
OA software (Alspaugh & Scacchi, 2012; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2013a). Now we see that 
such a DSL can be extended to incorporate software engineering process transactions 
using a process modeling language like PML (Noll & Scacchi, 2001; Scacchi, 2001) or a 
similar notation and that such extension is advantageous for managing OA software security 
system and engineering process challenges. The design and incorporation of these 
extensions into the DSL is thus a next step for us to research, develop, and refine. 
Last, we have also called for research and development of software obligations and 
rights management systems (SORMS) as a core capability for the DoD, government 
agencies, and other enterprises to help manage and improve their OA software system 
buying power (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2015, 2016). We envision a SORMS that interprets and 
evaluates DSLs for software licensing as an essential tool for enterprises that manage OA 
software systems, such as those found in most large organizations in industry, government, 
and defense. Thus, we call for effort to add capabilities that extend the SORMS to 
accommodate blockchain ledger repositories, as decentralized or centralized databases, on 
which are enacted smart contracts for handling software development and evolution process 
update transactions. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we sought to stimulate the development of innovative approaches to 
continuously assuring the cybersecurity of open architecture (OA) software systems. We 
focused on exploring the potential for using blockchains and smart contract techniques and 
how they can be applied to support acquisition efforts for software systems for OA command 
and control or business enterprise (C2/B) systems. We further limited our focus to examining 
the routine software system updates to OA software configuration specifications that arise 
during the development and evolution processes arising during system acquisition. Our 
efforts described through our case study and related efforts thus denote a promising line of 
work in progress. Much remains to be done, but the direction forward appears robust and 
productive. We welcome questions and comments that identify possible oversights, and we 
suggest complementary capabilities that enhance the potential of blockchain and smart 
contract tools, techniques, and technologies for continuously assuring the cybersecurity of 
modular open architecture software systems. 
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